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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALMA J. JANKE et ux, 
Plaintiffs 
and Respondents, 
-vs.- Case No. 8866 
GEORGE L. BECKSTEAD, JR., et ux, 
Defendants 
and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Appellants will be referred to throughout this Brief 
by name or as they appeared in the Court below, namely, 
plaintiffs . Respondents will be referred to by name or as 
they appeared below, namely defendants. All italics are 
ours. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal is from the judgment in favor of plain-
tiffs which ordered the rewriting of a Deed from defen-
dants to plaintiffs. Defendants' counterclaim for the 
reasonable value of their land used by plaintiffs and for 
damages resulting from the malicious clouding of de-
fendants' title to certain lands was dismissed. 
The basic contest between plaintiffs and defendants 
involves a strip of land 33 feet wide. The reformation 
of the deed ordered by the trial court moved the 33-foot 
strip from the west side of plaintiffs' land to the east side 
of plaintiffs' land and had the effect of cutting down land 
retained by defendant, Fay D. Beckstead, from a piece 
7 5 feet wide to a piece 42 feet wide. 
Defendant, Fay D. Beckstead~ was, prior to January, 
195 I, the owner of a piece of property located at 5 I 65 
South 9th East Street, Salt Lake County. On said piece 
of property defendants had built a home and in January, 
195 I they offered said home for sale through the Betti-
lyon's Home Builders Co. Bettilyons interested plain-
tiffs in purchasing the home and on the 30th of January, 
1951, a Uniform Real Estate Contract was executed by 
all parties. 
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3 
An Earnest Money Receipt dated January 13, 1951 
had been signed by all of the parties and is Exhibit No. 11. 
The price as set forth in the Earnest Money Receipt shows 
that the ground to be sold was 140-foot front by 200-
foot deep, together with a share of water. A closing state-
ment shows the proration of taxes, insurance and reveals 
an examination of the abstract of title to the property. 
The Uniform Real Estate Contract showed the ad-
dress of the property and contained the following metes 
and bounds description: 
Com in cen county road 16.2 chs S & N 86° 10' 
W 13.55 chs fr cen Sec. 8, T 2S, R IE, SL Mer. 
thence 140 feet South; thence 200 feet East, thence 
140 feet North, thence 200 feet West to the point 
of beginning; 
Together with one share Tanner Ditch Water Com-
pany. 
The Uniform Real Estate Contract also contains 
a provision that a mortgage was to be assumed by plain-
tiffs and the purchase price of the land to be paid down 
to the mortgage as soon as plaintiff sold certain of their 
real property. The mortgage is Exhibit No. 13. It shows 
the description of the West 158 feet of the property which 
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4 
was covered by the Uniform Real Estate Contract. The 
mortgage contains a specific reference to the 33 foot right 
of way for 9th East Street. 
At the time the defendants signed the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract, Exhibit No. 9, the defendant Fay D. 
Beckstead was the owner of additional property at the 
same place. It is described as commencing in the center 
of 9th East Street, going South 250.86 feet, East 275 feet, 
North 232.43 feet, more or less; thence west 275.616 feet 
to the point of beginning. <See description in Exhibit 
No.4). 
This description with the piece described to plain-
tiff eliminated, left a piece in the name of Mrs. Fay Beck-
stead of approximately 75.616 feet wide along the east side 
of the property contracted to plaintiffs. 
Prior to the signing of the Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract, defendants did not discuss with plaintiffs the 
boundary lines of the property. There \Yas nothing on 
the plot which showed where the east side of the property 
contracted to plaintiffs was located. After the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract was executed there was a meeting 
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5 
between defendants and plaintiff, Alma J. Janke, which 
occurred in the basement of the Y.M.C.A. At the meet-
ing there was some discussion concerning the possibility 
of selling the retained land which defendant, Fay Beck-
stead owned. A price could not be agreed upon and so 
no deal was consumated. Plaintiff, Alma Janke, also 
stated that there was a discussion concerning certain 
water which had flooded the basement of the home 
which was purchased from the Becksteads. ( R. 62, 
R. 63 and R. 162). 
Apparently the meeting between the Jankes and the 
Becksteads, in the basement of the Y.M.C.A., was the 
only discussion in 1951 of any of the problems which the 
parties were concerned with. In December, 1951, a Deed 
to the property involved was prepared. Photostat of this 
deed is Exhibit No. I 0. Description in the deed followed 
the description contained in the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract, and further recites that the property is trans-
ferred subject to a mortgage in favor of Tracy-Collins 
Trust Company in the original sum of $7200.00 upon 
which there was an unpaid balance of $6673.11. Grantees 
assumed and agreed to pay the mortgage according to 
its terms. This is the mortgage which is Exhibit No. 13. 
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Plaintiffs went into possession of the property in 
March of 1951, and during all of the year of 1951 oc-
cupied the premises either through their daughter who 
lived in the basement, or personally. <R. 61). 
The mortgage which was assumed specifically men-: 
tions the right-of-way on the west 33 feet of the property. 
At the time the Deed was prepared and the assumption 
of the mortgage was agreed to, an attorney's opinion was 
obtained for A. J. Janke by Tracy-Collins Trust Company. 
This attorney's opinion is dated January 3, 1952 and is 
Exhibit No. 12. The opinion shows that the abstract was 
brought up to date as of 8:55A.M. on December 31, 1951. 
The opinion specifically mentions the 33-foot right-of-
way along the West side of the property in two separate 
places. 
Plaintiffs deny that they ever read either the descrip-
tions of the property as contained in the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract or in the Deed ''"hich '\Yas furnished to 
them or that they ever saw the mortgage which they as-
sumed and agreed to pay, or knew of the attorney's 
opinion. 
They claim that the only place where they found 
any indication as to where the property lines were was 
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7 
on a copy of certain plats which were used in the con-
struction of the home by Beckstead. Exhibit No. 5. 
Exhibit No. 5 is the copy of the Plans and Speci-
fications of the house which were furnished for the 
builder, George Barnett. 
There is nothing in the Plans or Specifications to 
indicate the property line of defendants' property at the 
time the home was under construction. 
Plaintiffs claim that the builders' copy of the Plans 
and Specifications for the construction of the home were 
furnished to them by E. R. Beckstead, one of the Real 
Estate salesmen working for Bettilyon's Real Estate Com-
pany. Beckstead denies that he furnished the Plans and 
Specifications. The Plans and Specifications show only 
that the house being purchased by plaintiffs was located 
40 feet back from the edge of the 9th East Street right-
of-way. 
After the deed to the property had been delivered, 
and some time prior to October 31, 1953, defendants dis-
covered that plaintiffs were constructing a dog-run and 
other structures on the east side of their property which 
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appeared to be over on the property defendant, Fay Beck-
stead, had retained. Mr. Beckstead and one, Hall, measur-
ed the ground and discovered that it was a fact that the 
plaintiffs were on the property. 
A letter was written, Exhibit No. 7, dated the 31st 
day of October, 1953. 
This letter clearly notifies plaintiffs that defendants 
claim that plaintiffs are occupying a portion of the proper-
ty which was retained by Fay Beckstead. It gives plain-
tiffs the right to purchase the property when defendants 
decided to sell. 
Numerous conversations occurred between Fay Beck-
stead and the J ankes concerning the occupancy by J ankes 
of part of Mrs. Beckstead's property. An additional letter 
was written on May 24, 1954, Exhibit P-8, concerning the 
property being occupied by J ankes, and this letter set a 
rental fee of $25.00 per year on the property. No rent 
was paid. On March 18, 1955 a letter was written by 
Hurd & Hurd. This letter, Exhibit No. 14, points out to 
the plaintiffs their occupancy of property in excess of 
that which was sold to them, refers to the $25.00 per year 
rental item, and requests information concerning the ac-
tion which the J ankes intended to take. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
Additional conversations occurred. No satisfactory 
solution could be agreed upon, and on August 8, 1956 
plaintiffs filed the complaint which commenced the ac-
tion now on appeal to this court. 
The evidence concerning discussions which occurred 
after the deed was delivered is not reconcilable. De-
fendants deny that they have ever stated that the line 
marking the west boundary of the property sold to plain-
tiffs was in any place other than in the middle of 9th 
East Street. Plaintiffs testified that on several occasions, 
when discussions occurred, Mr. Beckstead indicated that 
the property line was somewhere along the edge of the 
right of way for 9th East Street. There was no evidence 
that Mrs. Beckstead had ever made any statement to 
either of plaintiffs concerning the line along the west 
side of the property. 
The only monument referred to in the Deed, Uni-
form Real Estate Contract, or Mortgage, is the center of 
9th East Street, There is no dispute between the parties 
that said monument has remained in the same position 
at all times relevant to the dispute. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING A DEED TO BE VARIED 
BY PAROL EVIDENCE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING A DEED TO BE VARIED 
BY PAROL EVIDENCE. 
The warranty deed was delivered on or about the 
29th day of December, 1951, the date it bears. It con-
tained a description of the real property which was being 
transferred by Fay Beckstead to plaintiffs in the follow-
ing language: 
"Commencing at a point in the center of a 
County road 16.2 chains South and North 86° 
10' West 13.55 chains, more or less, from the cen-
ter of Section 8, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, 
Salt Lake Meridian; thence 140 feet South; thence 
200 feet East; thence 140 feet North; thence 200 
feet West to the point of beginning." 
The description clearly sets forth a metes and bounds 
description which can be traced and closed and which 
does not, therefore, contain any patent ambiguity. It 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
II 
contains no ambiguity which is obvious from the reading 
of the description. The description can also be traced out 
on the ground as is revealed by the Plat. (Exhibit No. 
16). As a consequence there are neither patent or latent 
ambiguities in the description contained in the Warranty 
Deed from Fay Beckstead to the plaintiffs. 
There was no representation by defendants con-
cerning the commencement line of the property prior to 
the execution of the Uniform Real Estate Contract which 
contained an identical description to the description 
placed in the Warranty Deed. The evidence of the de-
fendants indicates that they were never on the ground 
with plaintiffs during the year 1951 but only at a con-
ference with the plaintiff, Alma Janke, at the Y.M.C.A. 
during that year. At that meeting the boundary line of 
the property was not the subject matter of the discus-
sion. 
There was no evidence that there was a mistake of 
fact on the part of the defendants concerning where the 
Fay Beckstead property commenced. Apparently, they 
were well aware at all times that the property ran from 
the middle of 9th East Street. 
If there were latent ambiguities within the deed so 
that until ym.! applied the description to the ground one 
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could not discover the ambiguity, evidence of a parol 
nature would be admissible under the general rule. For 
a discussion of the cases setting forth the Rule where a 
latent ambiguity appears in the description of the real 
property, see Detroit, Grand Haven & Milwaukee RR 
Co. v. Alfred -Howland, 246 Mich. 318, 224 NW 366, 
68 ALR 1. 
If the ambiguity is a patent ambiguity and it ap-
pears from an examination of the description that there 
is some kind of a mistake or discrepancy within the four 
comers of the description, then the rule has always been 
that no parol evidence shall be admitted to correct the 
deed for the deed itself is void for uncertainty. A very 
careful examination of latent and patent ambiguities is 
contained in Thompson, On Real Property, Vol 6, page 
454, Section 3280 and Section 3281. 
There appears to be no exception to the rule that 
where the description in the deed sufficiently identifies 
the land to be conveyed neither parol or extrinsic evidence 
concerning the land to be covered by the deed is ad-
missible. 
It makes no difference that one of the parties had a 
different intention as far as the property to be received 
is concerned if his intentions are uncommunicated and not 
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contained in the description placed on the deed. It is 
obvious that a unilateral mistake by one of the parties 
would not justify reformation of the deed where the mis-
take was in no way induced by conduct of the other party 
and did not involve fraud. This rule is set forth in Brent 
v. Chase H. Lilly Co., 174 Fed. 877. The rationale of the 
rule is succinctly stated in Cordua v. Guggenheim, 274 
N.Y. 51, 8 NE 2d 274 where it is stated that the parties 
are conclusively presumed to have intended the meaning 
of the language used in the description of the property 
conveyed. Thompson, On Real Property, supra, Section 
3281, at page 455, states the rule in this language: 
"Nothing passes by deed except what is des-
cribed in it whatever the intention of the parties 
might have been." 
Many of the Evidence Treatise writers have recog-
nized that while the parol evidence rule is called a rule 
of evidence, as an actual fact, it is a rule of substantive 
law which is adhered to for the purpose of preventing 
written instruments from being eaten away and destroyed 
by parties attempting to recall the agreement or descrip-
tion. It is obvious that if a written instrument could be 
varied by recollection of the parties, the purpose for re-
ducing the document to writing, and the purpose of hav-
ing written deeds would be completly destroyed. 
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Jones on Evidence, 4th Ed. Vol. 2, page 863, Sec-
tion 450, states the rule from an evidence treatise point 
of view in the following language: 
"Parol evidence is not admissible to identify 
the land where the description in the contract is 
insufficient, nor may it be introduced in order 
to make the writing operative upon land which 
is not embraced in the descriptive words." 
One of the earliest cases setting forth the rule in its 
complete form is Drew v. Swift, 46 N. Y. 204, decided 
September 2nd, 1871. At page 208, the following quote 
appears: 
"The declarations of the defendant, or other 
parol evidence, could not be resorted to, to vary 
the terms or aid in the interpretation of the in-
strument. The description begins at a point capa-
ble of being ascertained, and runs thence by 
courses and distances well defined; and no ex-
trinsic evidence tending to explain the intention 
of the parties, and thus give effect to the deed 
different from its terms, was allowable. A deed 
cannot be contradicted, varied or explained by 
parol evidence. (Linscott v. Fernald, 5 Greenl. 496; 
Bell v. Morse 6N.H. 205; Van Wyck v. Wright, 
supra ( 18 W.R. 157) Clark v. Baird, 5 Seld., 183; 
Clark v. Wethy, 19 Wend. 320). It is distinctly 
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declared in the cases cited, and others that might 
be referred to, that upon principle, when the des-
cription in the deed designates a piece of land as 
that conveyed, the description cannot be departed 
from, by parol evidence of intent, or of acqui-
escence in another boundary, unless such an ad-
verse possession be shown as is, in itself, a bar 
to an action. (Adams v. Rockwell, 16 Wend. 285) . " 
A much later Massachusetts case, Peavy v. Moran, 
256 Mass. 311, 152 N. E. 360 at page 362, carries the rule 
up to modem time in the following language: 
"The description in the deed to the plaintiff 
was explicit and free from ambiguity. Consequent-
ly parol evidence was not admissible to vary or 
contradict it." 
As far as defendants has been able to discover this 
Court has not had an occasion to set down in specific 
language the parol evidence rule but in several cases the 
Court has recognized and applied the rule and stated that 
the law of Utah recognized and adhered to the rule. See 
Ruthauff v. Silver King Western Mine & Mill Co., 95 
Utah 279, 80 P. 2d 338; Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 
52, 185 P. 2d 264; Olson v. Reese, 114 Utah 411, 200 
P. 2d 733. 
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The trial court, in his decision and over the objec-
tions of defendants, has accepted and applied extrinsic and 
parol evidence in such a way as to completly change the 
property which was described in the warranty deed. 
The judgment of the Court awards to plaintiffs a 
piece of property, 140 x 200, which commences 33 feet 
east of the center of 9th East Street. No such line was 
ever mentioned or described in the deed or contract. No 
such line was ever discussed by the parties. The Court, 
in effect, is giving to plaintiffs what they would wish to 
have if they obtained from defendant property which after 
the execution and delivery of the contract and deed they 
discovered they would like. 
The Court's judgment destroys in a large measure 
the value of the east part of defendant Fay Beckstead's 
land. It reduces the strip there from a width of 75 feet, 
which is an adequate building lot, to a width of 43 feet 
which is too small a building lot to be usable in the vicini-
ty where the homes are being constructed. 
The Court's decree gives to plaintiffs something for 
which they did not bargain or pay for. and something 
which, under the terms of the written instrument no one 
ever intended for them to have. 
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It is respectfully submitted that the trial court per-
mitted a direct and extensive violation of the parol evi-
dence rule and allowed, by parol, the variance of a written 
deed and created a description which was never intended 
by the defendants nor the plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that this Court should 
reverse the trial court, should order that the Deed be res-
tored to its terms and that these defendants should be 
allowed and awarded a reasonable sum for the use of the 
property by the plaintiffs and for damages incurred for 
malicious clouding of the defendants' title. 
Respectfully submitted 
KING AND HUGHES 
Attorneys for defendants and Appellants 
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